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I. INTRODUCTION'
An attorney or law firm who represents a client whose interests are
1. All references in this comment to Canons, Disciplinary Rules (DRs), or
Ethical Considerations (ECs) refer to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
of the American Bar Association unless otherwise indicated. Because the Canons
are very broad statements of the ethical duties placed upon attorneys, a parallel
citation to their counterpart in the proposed final draft of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct is not provided. When there is a reference to an EC or a DR,
parallel citations to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules and the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct will be given where practical. In addition, because the cases
decided prior to 1970 were decided under the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics, the relevant counterparts of present Canons 2, 4, 5, and 9 are listed below:
ABA CODE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Canon 2 Canons 4, 7, 16, 37, 44.
Canon 4 Canons 5, 6, 37.
Canon 5 Canons 6, 44.
Canon 9 Canons 29, 36.
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adverse to those of a present2 or former 3 client faces conflicting ethical duties
regarding the second representation.4 The prior client expects that his at-
torney will continue to represent him in substantially related matters or at
least refrain from representing a competitor. The subsequent client expects
to obtain the services of the attorney of his choice. The lawyer is caught in
the middle.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit perhaps said
it best when it observed that no client can "reasonably expect to foreclose
either all lawyers formerly at the firm or even those who have represented
it on unrelated matters from subsequently representing an opposing party." 5
2. Where a lawyei has an adverse representation conflict with a present client,
the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty imposed by MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, DR 5-105 (1979) prevents continuation of the represen-
tation unless the lawyer obtains the consent of the affected client under id. DR
4-101(c), DR 5-105(c). The attorney has the burden of proving client consent after
full disclosure. This burden is extremely difficult to meet. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 227-29 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Hansen, 586
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1978). When a conflict with a present client exists, there is
little chance that the attorney will be permitted to continue the adverse represen-
tation because few rational clients will consent to allow their former attorney to repre-
sent interests adverse to their own after disclosure of such a conflict. See
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 227-29 (7th Cir. 1978);
IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1978). Butsee Unified Sewerage
Agency v.Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345-46, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (client found
to have consented to counsel's adverse representation).
3. A lawyer can be involved in an adversity of interests conflict when his own
interests conflict with those of a client. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, DR 5-102, DR 5-103, DR 5-104 (1979). Conflicting
interests also arise where the interests of two or more clients are in opposition. See
generally id. DR 5-105, DR 5-106. See also id. DR 5-107. The adversity of interests
conflict dealt with in this Comment is confined to conflicting interests between two
or more clients. Although it is obvious that the same law firm could not ethically
represent both sides in the same litigation, conflicting interests can also present
themselves indirectly. See generally Developments in the Law, Conflicts of Interest in the
Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981).
4. The ethical considerations presented by the existence of an adverse
representation conflict are presently considered by the courts to arise from MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, Canon 5, & Canon 9 (1979).
Canon 4 requires an attorney to "preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
Canon 5 requires that "a lawyer should exercise independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of a client." Canon 9 cautions attorneys to "avoid even the ap-
pearance of professional impropriety." The Ethical Considerations (ECs) and
Disciplinary Rules (DRs) which follow the Canons expand on the duties and pro-
vide mechanisms for their enforcement. Canon 2 and especially DR 2-110 (ethical
duties of attorneys in withdrawal situations) also have an important impact upon
the adverse representation conflict. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
5. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
757 (2d Cir. 1975).
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In a later case, the same court affirmed an order dismissing counsel, stating:
[T]here is a particularly trenchant reason for requiring a high stan-
dard of proof on the part of one who seeks to disqualify his former
counsel, for in disqualification matters we must be solicitous of a
client's right freely to choose his counsel-a right which of course
must be balanced against the need to maintain the highest standards
of the profession.... A client whose attorney is disqualified incurs
a loss of time and money in being compelled to retain new counsel
who in turn have to become familiar with the prior comprehensive
investigation which is the core of modern complex litigation. The
client moreover may lose the benefit of its longtime counsel's
specialized knowledge of its operations.
6
It is necessary to strike a delicate balance between the right of a former client
to preserve the confidentiality of his past communications and the right of
the present client to counsel of his choice. 7
This Comment analyzes the issue of attorney disqualification and the
related problem of the disqualified attorney's work product. 8 The first part
of this Comment examines the current mode of analysis used in these cases
(traditional analysis) and its problems. Of particular importance is the conflict
between the withdrawing lawyer's ethical duties under Canon 2 to "avoid
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client" and the duties imposed by
other Canons9 to preserve client confidences.
The second part of this Comment proposes a method of analysis that
attempts to reconcile the conflicting ethical duties imposed by the ABA Model
6. Government of India v. Cook Industries, 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978).
7. The right to freely obtain counsel of one's choice is given great weight by
the courts. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1349
(9th Cir. 1981); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories,
607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979); Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1240,
1248 (2d Cir, 1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring); Central Milk Producers Coop.
v. Sentry Food Stores, 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1978); Government of India
v. Cook Industries, 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978); Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v.
Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1980); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
757 (2d Cir. 1975); Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (E.D. Tex.
1980).
8. The term "attorney work product" has a specialized meaning. Normally,
it is used where opposing counsel is seeking to obtain access to information in his
adversary's file. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 425 (1947). In the con-
text of this Comment, attorney work product covers the same kind of information,
but it is the client of a disqualified attorney, not the adversary, who is seeking ac-
cess to the information. See also note 31 and accompanying text infra.
9. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4
(1979) (duty to preserve client confidences); id. Canon 5 (duty to prevent impair-
ment of professional judgment by avoiding conflicting representations); id. Canon
9 (duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety).
1982]
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Code of Professional Responsibility.' 0 The proposal separates disqualification
questions into several categories, which are intended to clarify judicial reason-
ing and improve the uniformity and predictability of decisions." The pro-
posal would, among other things, channel disqualification issues into the
bar's disciplinary machinery or separate malpractice actions, avoiding litiga-
tion of these issues prior to trial of the underlying cause of action.12
II. TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
The early decisions laying the foundation for attorney disqualification
in multiclient conflict of interest cases recognized both the need to protect
client confidences and the need for judicial flexibility to avoid undue in-
terference with the right of other clients to obtain counsel of their choice.
The courts that struggled with difficult adverse representation cases even-
tually reached a rough consensus on the proper method of analyzing them.
Today, the client who seeks to disqualify his former attorney need only
demonstrate:
that the subject matters embraced within the pending suit wherein
the former attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substan-
tially related to the matter or cause of action wherein the attorney
previously represented him, the former client. The Court will assume
that during the course of the former representation confidences were
disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject matter of the
representation. 13
The first part of this is the "substantial relationship test" which forms the
theoretical basis of traditional analysis.' 4 There are three steps to traditional
analysis. First, there must be a substantial relationship between the two
10. See Part IV. infra.
11. See note 82 and accompanying text infra.
12. Although the question of whether an attorney will be allowed to continue
to participate in litigation is relevant to the underlying cause of action, availability
of a disqualified attorney's work product and his professional misconduct are side
issues. The appropriateness of using pending litigation for resolving these issues
is considered in Part IV.C. infra.
13. T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 133 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
14. See generally Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Realco Ser-
vices v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Another reason for disqualifica-
tion of counsel has been Canon 9's mandate to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
See generally Kramer, The Appearance of lmpropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal
Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1981); O'Toole, Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV.
313 (1979); Note, Disqualification of Counselfor the Appearance of Professional Impropriety,
25 CATH. U.L. REV. 343 (1976); 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1319;Appearance
of Impropriety as the Sole Groundfor Disqualification, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1516 (1977).
[Vol. 47
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representations. Second, the court will presume that the lawyer received con-
fidences from the first client. Third, the court will determine whether the
disqualified attorney's work product may be given to the second client.
A. Substantial Relationship
A former client must first establish the existence of a prior attorney-client
relationship between himself and the attorney sought to be disqualified. Next,
he must demonstrate a substantial relationship between the two
representations.1 5 The court looks at the subject matter of both representa-
tions to determine whether the issues and facts are substantially identical
in both and whether the second representation is, in fact, adverse to the first.' 6
Finally, it determines whether the representations are so similar that con-
fidences given in one would be relevant in the other.' 7
B. Presumption of Confidences
Once substantial relationship has been established, the court will presume
that during the prior representation the former client disclosed confidences
relevant to the attorney's subsequent adverse representation.' 8 This
presumption protects the former client against revealing the very confidences
he is seeking to protect by using the disqualification motion. 19 Though the
presumption is sometimes considered irrebuttable, 20 many courts allow
rebuttal if the attorney can show that he received no relevant confidences
from the former client. 2' If the presumption is not rebutted, the attorney's
15. See cases cited note 14 supra.
16. See, e.g., T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
17. See Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020,
1028-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending); Government of India v. Cook Industries,
569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978); Realco Services v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867,
871-72 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
18. See, e.g., T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 468, 416 A.2d 852,
856 (1980).
19. See generally T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp.
265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1315.
20. See Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020,
1028 (5th Cir. 1981) (irrebuttable presumption arises when substantial relation-
ship shown to exist) (appeal pending); Arkansas v. Dean Food Products Co., 605
F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979) (irrefutable presumption arises when substantial rela-
tionship shown to exist), overruled on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Products
Liability, 612 F.2d 377 (Sth Cir.), vacated on same grounds sub nom. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1980); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83
N.J. 460,473, 416 A. 2d 852, 859 (1980) (presumption of access to and knowledge
of confidences may not be rebutted).
21. See Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607
F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d
1982]
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continued participation in the case is tainted due to the risk of revelation
or misuse of the former client's confidences. This threat of taint to the
underlying trial requires that the attorney be disqualified. 22
If one attorney in a law firm represented a former client and an affiliated
attorney23 engages in a subsequent representation adverse to the former
client's interest, the courts apply the concept of vicarious disqualification. 24
Traditional analysis again applies the substantial relationship test and
presumes that confidences were given.2 5 The court further presumes that
the attorney who represented the former client discussed that client's con-
824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Realco Services v. Holt,
479 F. Supp. 867, 872 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Attorneys have successfully rebutted
the presumption of knowledge of former client confidences. See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron
of Arizona v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1980); Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1309, 1310 (E.D. Tex.
1980).
22. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 922 (E.D. Va. 1981).
23. The duty to preserve a client's confidences and secrets imposed upon a
lawyer by Canon 4 extends to the attorney's associates and employees as well.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) (1979) states "A
lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others
whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets
of a client.... " MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 4-101(D) is identical. Seealso MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5, DR 5-105(D) (1979); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), 1.9(b), 5.1 (Proposed Final Draft
1981). This duty to preserve client confidences continues after termination of the
attorney's employment by the client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY EC 4-6 (1979) ("The obligation of alawyerto preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment. .... "). Mo.
SUP. CT. R. 4, EC 4-6 is identical. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.9 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
24. Vicarious disqualification is the disqualification of attorneys who are part-
ners, associates, or affiliates of an attorney who is required to decline or withdraw
from employment. An attorney who creates the possibility of disqualification due
to an adverse representation conflict is considered to be tainted by his knowledge
of a prior client's confidences. Vicarious disqualification is implemented by MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1979) which states: "If
a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under
a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm may accept or continue such employment." See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases,
514 F. Supp. 914, 922 (E.D. Va. 1981). MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 5-105(D) limits
vicarious disqualification to situations where an attorney is required "to decline
or withdraw from employment under DR 5-105." See also MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.10, 1.1 1(c), 1.12(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). For
a discussion of vicarious disqualification and its impact, see Comment, The Dis-
qualification Dilemma: DR 5-105(D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 56 NEV.
L. REV. 692 (1977); 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1319.
25. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
6
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fidences with affiliated attorneys. This makes all attorneys in a law firn privy
to the former client's confidences and subject to vicarious disqualification.2 6
Some courts allow rebuttal of the presumption of shared confidences be-
tween affiliated attorneys.2 Most courts allow a law frmn employing a former
government attorney to rebut the presumed sharing of the former client's
confidences if an effective "Chinese Wall"28 is erected within the firm.
Failure to rebut the presumed sharing of confidences results in disqualifica-
tion of both the tainted attorney and the firm in question. 29 Disqualifica-
tion is required to prevent a taint to the underlying trial from the possible
revelation or misuse of the former client's confidences.3 0
C. Work Product
When counsel has been disqualified, the question becomes whether his
work product 3' will be made available to substitute counsel. The courts
26. See Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607
F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) ("it is reasonable to presume that members of a law
firm freely share their client's confidences with one another"); Arkansas v. Dean
Food Products Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979) ("confidences imputed to
the attorney are presumed shared among his partners and employees associated
with him at that time"), overruled on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Products
Liability, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.), vacated on same grounds sub nom. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1980).
27. See cases cited note 21 supra.
28. See notes 54-58"and accompanying text infra.
29. See In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 922 (E.D. Va. 1981).
30. WVhen a law firm hires a new associate or a new partnership is created,
the law firm should consider what impact the new attorney's presence has upon
the firm's existing clientele. The law firm may be "hiring a conflict," which could
cause the firrh to lose a longstanding client due to disqualification under DR
5-105(D). See note 24 supra. See also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
567 F.2d 225, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1977) (law firms containing tainted attorney and co-
counsel both disqualified); Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1348,
1385-87 (2d Cir. 1976) (law firm disqualified because partner of plaintiff's firm was
also partner in defendant's fitm); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 924, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1954) (plaintiff's law firm dis-
qualified due to former affiliation of plaintiff's attorney with defendant's law firm).
31. The term "attorney work product" was coined in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). In Hickman, opposing counsel sought to discover infor-
mation from his adversary contained in his adversary's work product. The work
product of an attorney is the sifting of information during the preparation of a case
and involves the development of legal theories and strategy, all of which is reflected
in interviews, statements, memoranda, etc., prepared by an attorney. Work pro-
duct is normally thought of as an extension of the evidentiary privilege. In contrast
to the Hickman work product availability situation is the issue of the availability of
an attorney's work product to a client from whose representation the attorney was
disqualified. In the latter situation, the attorney is under an ethical duty to turn
over his work product to the client he represented prior to disqualification even
though the work product is at least intangibly infected by the attorney's taint.
7
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recognize no clear standardized test for resolution of the problem; they ap-
pear to decide cases on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, according to the equities
in a given case.3 2
A theoretical inconsistency is created by the use of traditional analysis
to resolve the work product issue. There is a direct conflict between the dis-
qualified attorney's duty under DR 2-110(A) to avoid prejudice to his cur-
rent client by turning over his work product and Canon 4's mandate to pro-
tect the confidences of the former client. 33 Disqualification due to presumed
knowledge of the former client's confidences creates the further presump-
tion that the attorney's knowledge colored his judgment, at least intangibly,
in his preparation of even routine legal work for the current client. A strict
application of traditional analysis requires withholding the presumptively
tainted work product from the current client. The work product issue would
thus be decided by the decision to disqualify counsel. 34 This effectively ig-
nores the current client's rights and gives total emphasis to protection of the
former client's confidences.
Traditional analysis is not always applied so mechanically. In First
Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp. ,5 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected strict application of the analysis.
The work product ... if"tainted" in the present case [is] only
so by virtue of the application of a per se sanction flowing from the
disqualification [of counsel], and relating back in extent to the begin-
ning of the cause for disqualification. They are not "tainted" by
virtue of having been based on confidential knowledge or other ad-
vantage gained during or from the dual representation. 36
The court instead opted for a broader standard, applied on a case-by-case
basis.
The movant who claims that its opponent should be denied the work
product ... should be in the best possible position to point out to
the district court the facets of the relationship which it had with the
disqualified counsel which would somehow give an improper advan-
tage against it .... Such matters, of course, if protection thereof
is needed, can be addressed to the court on an in camera basis. 37
The First Wisconsin test requires the former client to reveal his confidences
32. See note 34 infra.
33. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
34. Traditional analysis would make disqualification and work product
availability a single question. Production of a disqualified attorney's work product
effectively reveals the prior client's confidences because the disqualified attorney's
taint would necessarily infect the work product. See, e.g., Reardon v. Marlayne,
Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 478, 416 A.2d 852, 862 (1980). But see First Wisconsin Mortgage
Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 210 (7th Cir. 1978) (court rejected
argument that work product issue must be in pari materia with disqualification).
35. 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 207.
37. Id. at 209.
[Vol. 47
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to the court so that it can determine whether they are disclosed in the dis-
qualified attorney's work product. Traditional analysis rejects this test as
repugnant to Canon 4's mandate to "preserve the confidences and secrets
of a client.' '38 The test also undermines the purpose of the presumptions
that arise on satisfaction of the substantial relationship test, creating more
inconsistency.3 9
III. PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
There are four major problems with traditional analysis. First, the courts'
need for flexibility creates inconsistent and unpredictable results due to case-
by-case modifications. Second, attorneys are treated differently based on
whether they become tainted in government service or private practice.
Third, inflexible application results in overinclusion of attorneys subject to
disqualification. Fourth, it fails to reconcile the conflicting ethical duties im-
posed on attorneys by the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
A. Uncertainty
Clients legitimately expect that their attorneys will not act adversely to
them in subsequent related matters. 40 From the attorney's perspective, a
client does not have ajustifiable expectation that a law firm with thousands
of clients will examine each file before accepting a new client. Passage of
time and changes in personnel occasionally allow adverse representation con-
flicts to arise inadvertently. Both the courts and the bar recognize this, at
least tacitly, because courts often disqualify counsel while carefully noting
that disqualification in itself does not imply misconduct. 41
Client expectations and the courts' need for flexibility have led to case-
38. See note 34 supra.
39. See Part II.B. supra.
40. The present ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not deal
specifically with the conflict between duties owed to current and former clients. The
Working Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, "would in-
corporate, almost unchanged, the substantial relationship test with its two re-
quirements as developed at common law." 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1318
n. 169. To be more precise, the client has the right to expect that his attorney's loyalty
will prevent the attorney from accepting future representations adverse to the client's
interests in substantially related matters. This expectation finds support in MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1, EC 4-6, EC 5-1, EC 5-14, DR
5-105(B) (1979). MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, EC 4-1, EC 4-6, EC 5-1, EC 5-14 are iden-
tical. Id. DR 5-105(B) omits the following language contained in the Model Code:
"or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests." See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6(a), 1.7(a), 1.8, 1.9(a) (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981).
41. See Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1385-86 (2d Cir.
1976) (no "actual wrongdoing" by plaintiff's attorney but disqualified for ap-
pearance of impropriety). But see Realco Services v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 875
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (attorneys have "a duty to actively seek out possible conflicts").
1982]
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by-case modifications of traditional analysis since its origin. 42 In Laskey
Brothers v. Warner Brothers Pictures,43 for example, the presumed receipt of client
confidences was made rebuttable.4 4 The question of whether and when the
presumption can be rebutted is still litigated, as evidenced by Arkansas v.
Dean Food Products . 4 5 In Dean Food, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit apparently opted for an irrebuttable presumption, noting
that under Canon 4, "[t]he attorney-client relationship raises an irrefutable
presumption that confidences were disclosed." 46 Nonetheless, the court's
desire for flexibility apparently influenced it to affirm the district court's
refusal to disqualify the tainted attorney's co-counsel. 4 7 Dean Food, while mak-
ing the presumption irrebuttable as to the tainted attorney, may offer a large
exception for attorneys subject to vicarious disqualification.4 8
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Redd v. Shell Oil Co. 49 raises another troubling question. The court
affirmed the summary denial of a disqualification motion although it stated
that serious consideration of the motion would have been warranted had
it been filed earlier. 50 Disqualification motions can be used as a delaying
tactic, 51 but if courts are truly concerned with the protection of client con-
fidences and avoiding taint to the judicial process, the timing of the motion
arguably should not affect its disposition. 52
42. This approach originated in T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
43. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
44. Id. at 827. The court stated: "It will not do to make the presumption of
confidential information rebuttable and then to make the standard of proof for rebut-
tal unattainably high." Id.
45. 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece
Rim Products Liability, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.), vacated on same grounds sub nom.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1980).
46. Id. at 384.
47. Id. at 386-87. The Dean Food court further held that only the members of
the disqualified Assistant Attorney General's staff actively involved in theunderlying
litigation need also be disqualified. Id.
48. Dean Food implies that only the members of a law firm who actually par-
ticipated in a case with a tainted attorney are subject to disqualification. The prob-
lem with this argument is that the Office of the Attorney General was involved in
Dean Food and practical necessity prevented disqualification of the entire staff. Thus,
the value of Dean Food as authority for this argument is questionable.
49. 581 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975).
50. Id. at 315. The court stated that the late filing of the disqualification mo-
tion "fully justified the summary rejection of the motion." Id.
51. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979).
52. Allowing late filing to justify summary denial of the motion as a method
of docket control raises the question whether Canon 4's mandate to preserve client
confidences should predominate over the other Canons. If docket control, for ex-
ample, is a legitimate basis for denial of a disqualification motion, it is possible that
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These cases illustrate some of the uncertainty and unpredictability caused
by traditional analysis. In attempting to balance and ameliorate the hard-
ships in each case, the courts have strayed from the basic ethical underpin-
ning of the analysis.
53
B. Preferential Treatment
Traditional analysis provides preferential treatment for former govern-
ment attorneys over those in private practice. Courts permit a law firm to
employ a tainted former government attorney and continue to participate
in the subsequent case if the firm erects a "Chinese Wall '5 4 around the
tainted attorney. A Chinese Wall is basically a screening device to shield
the tainted former government attorney from any contact with the firm's
conflicting representation. 55 Where the courts find an effective Chinese Wall,
the taint of the attorney is not imputed to other members of the firm. 56
This is a modification of traditional analysis, made to permit govern-
ment entities to get qualified attorneys and to allow those attorneys to return
to private practice in the field of expertise they developed in government
service. Attorneys who change affiliation in the private sector are not per-
Canon 4 should be subordinate to other Canons where both would be applicable.
This argument is strengthened by reference to the exceptions of DR 4-101(C) which
particularize the circumstances under which an attorney may reveal his client's con-
fidences. If DR 4-101(C)(2) (lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets when per-
mitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order") and DR
2-1 10(A)(2) (withdrawing attorney must deliver to his client" all papers and prop-
erty" to which he is entitled) are read together, a disqualified attorney could reveal
confidences contained in his work product under DR 4-101(C)(2) because DR
2-1 10(A)(2) requires him to deliver his work product to his former client upon dis-
qualification. See also note 106 infra.
When courts express the opinion that a motion to disqualify would have war-
ranted serious consideration had it been filed on time, see, e.g., Central Milk Pro-
ducers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1978); Redd v.
Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975), the failure to timely file could
have malpractice ramifications.
53. See note 4 supra.
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976), set up the criteria for the construction
of a Chinese Wall. Without the Chinese Wall exception to vicarious disqualifica-
tion, traditional analysis would disqualify a law firm hiring a tainted former govern-
ment attorney under DR 5-105(D). For a discussion of vicarious disqualification
under DR 5-105(D), see note 24 and accompanying text supra.
55. For a discussion of the use of the Chinese Wall, see generally Comment,
Disqualification of the Former Government Attorney and the Affiliated Firm: Allegiance to Form
Over Substance?, 84 DICK. L. REV. 669 (1980); Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense
to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980); Disqualfication- "Screen-
ing" to Rebut the Automatic Law Firm Disqualification Rule, 82 DICK. L. REV. 625
(1978).
56. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1980). See also note 98 infra.
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mitted to use the Chinese Wall,5 7 though it appears that a firm employing
a tainted former legal services attorney may be allowed to use it.58
C. Overinclusiveness
Strict adherence to traditional analysis has disqualified attorneys who
have no knowledge of any confidences or secrets of the client. 59 This
overinclusiveness is particularly troublesome because the increasing mobility
of attorneys, within the private sector and between governmental or
quasi-governmental 60 and private sectors, places an exceptionally heavy
57. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311,
1321-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note
3, at 1365. But see Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1309-10 (E.D. Tex.
1980). Although Chinese Wall was not directly discussed in Lemaire, a nonparticipa-
tion agreement between private sector attorneys prevented imputation of the tainted
attorney's knowledge to members of the hiring firm under DR 5-105(D).
58. In Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
450 U.S. 903 (1981), the Second Circuit ordered disqualification of a law firm
employing a tainted legal services attorney. The court indicated that the thirty-five
member law firm was too small to create a Chinese Wall. Id. at 1057-59. This deci-
sion was summarily vacated by the United States Supreme Court, 450 U.S. 903
(1981), citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981)
(denials of disqualification motions are not final appealable orders). However, a
petition for a writ of mandamus may be an appropriate method for review of denied
disqualification motions. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. at 372 n. 7, 378-79 n. 13 (court hints that writ of mandamus may be appropriate
in certain cases); Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1981) (appeal from denial of disqualification motion treated as petition for writ
of mandamus). See also Annot., 44 A.L.R. Fed. 709, 715-16 (1979).
In any event, if Cheng is followed, a new exception to vicarious disqualification
will be available. Since a legal services attorney is much like an associate in a large
law firm, see generally 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1363 n.392; Professional
Responsibility-Conflicts of Interest Between Legal Aid Lawyers, 37 MO. L. REV. 346
(1972), private attorneys may successfully extend the Cheng decision to allow them
to use a Chinese Wall. But cf. Yaretsky v. Blum, No. 76 Civ. 3360 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
28, 1981), where the same former legal services attorney involved in Cheng dis-
qualified his new firm. Although the Yaretsky court attempted to avoid Cheng, the
decisions are parallel. References to firm size in both cases should be rejected as
a basis for determining the applicability of a Chinese Wall. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
955 (1978) (no separate disqualification rules based on firm size).
59. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (doubts about
propriety of continued participation resolved in favor of disqualification); Hull v.
Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Note, supra note 14, at
353; U. MIAMI L. REV., supra note 14, at 1519. But see Realco Services v. Holt, 479
F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1979), where the court stated that "the difficulty with such
a standard [resolving doubts in favor of disqualification] is the danger that it will
serve as a substitute for analysis rather than as a guide to it." Id. at 872 n.4.
60. Quasi-governmental practice includes attorneys involved in legal services
work and similar situations. See note 58 supra.
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burden on law firms hiring these experienced attorneys. 61
Canon 9's mandate to "avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety" 62 has been the main theoretical justification for overinclusive
disqualification orders. The court in Dean Food, for example, asserted that
Canon 4 is "inextricably wedded" to Canon 9.63 The marriage of these
canons is an inappropriate substitute for analysis and results in the overinclu-
sion of attorneys subject to disqualification. 64 Accordingly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Woods v. Covington County Bank,65
stated that "congressional policy ... simply requires [that] Canon 9 dis-
qualification orders be based on a specifically identifiable appearance of
impropriety." 66 The court articulated a test for Canon 9 disqualification:
[A]n attorney need not be disqualified even where there is a
reasonable possibility of improper professional conduct. As we have
seen, a court must also find that the likelihood of public suspicion
or obloquy outweighs the social interests which will be served by a
lawyer's continued participation in a particular case. Under Canon
9, an attorney should be disqualified only when both of these stan-
dards have been satisfied. 67
The "social interests" the court refers to are the right of a client to freely
choose his counsel and the prevention of delays in the litigation process. 68
Even under this test, these interests are often found to be outweighed by
the need for disqualification, perhaps because of the tremendous discretion
given courts to speculate about the degree of public awareness of the possi-
ble conflicts in a particular case. 69
D. Ethical Conflicts
Traditional analysis fails to address the conflicting ethical duties sur-
61. See note 30 supra.
62. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, Canon 9 is identical.
63. 605 F.2d at 385. Accord Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 470, 416
A.2d 852, 857 (1980). See also notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
64. See American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (5th
Cir. 1971); Realco Services v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 872 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Kramer, supra note 14, at 255; O'Toole, supra note 14, at 322; 94 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 3, at 1326. See also comments to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCTRules 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11 (a), 1.12(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The com-
ments appear to reject the appearance of impropriety standard as too rigid.
65. 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 812 (involving qualified exemption from Canon 9 to active naval
personnel).
67. Id. at 813 n.12. Seealso Church ofScientology v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691,
693 (5th Cir. 1980) (Canon 9 test requires "showing of a reasonable possibility that
some specifically identifiable impropriety occurred and the likelihood of public suspi-
cion must be weighed against the interest in retaining counsel of one's choice").
Both tests allow great leeway for the courts to speculate about possible public
suspicion.
68. 537 F.2d at 810.
69. See 94 HARV. L. REV., supra note 3, at 1319.
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rounding the availability of a disqualified attorney's work product. 70 The
term "work product" was coined in Hickman v. Taylor,71 where the United
States Supreme Court observed that sifting of information, preparation of
legal theories, and planning of strategies is reflected in "interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, per-
sonal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways,' '72 all of which
are included in work product. Hickman involved counsel seeking to discover
information contained in his opponent's file. 73 In contrast, the issue created
by disqualification is whether the client can get access to his own file.
7 4
Court-ordered disqualification of an attorney brings into play the man-
datory withdrawal duties of DR 2-110. 7 5 The rule requires that an attorney,
prior to withdrawal, take steps to "avoid foreseeable prejudice" to his client
and deliver to him "all papers and property to which the client is entitled."76
This obligation conflicts with Canon 4's duty to preserve the former client's
confidences. Traditional analysis fails to address this conflict. 77
In First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp. ,7 the work pro-
duct issue was resolved by rejecting strict application of traditional analysis
in favor of a case-by-case determination. The court allows the moving party
the opportunity to show what relevant confidences might be contained in
the work product, and the court then screens the work product to see if it
is tainted by those confidences. 7 9 Strict traditional analysis, on the other hand,
deems the work product of a disqualified attorney to be per se tainted. 0 This
is necessary because allowing any of the work product to be made available
is irreconcilably inconsistent with the theoretical basis of traditional analysis.8'
70. See note 31 supra.
71. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
72. Id. at 511.
73. Id. at 509.
74. See note 31 supra.
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1 10(B)(2) (1979)
requires an attorney to withdraw from employment if "[h]e knows or it is obvious
that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule." Mo.
SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-1 10(B)(2) is identical. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 16(a)(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1981); note 106 infra.
76. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A) (1979).
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, DR 2-110(A) is identical. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
77. See note 108 and accompanying text infra. See also 94 HARV. L. REV., supra
note 3, at 1318 n.169.
78. 584 F.2d 201, 201 (7th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 209.
80. See note 34 supra.
81. Because the purpose of disqualification is to protect the confidences and
secrets of the prior client under Canon 4, an attorney sufficiently tainted to require
disqualification would at least intangibly infect his work product with the same taint.
See note 34 supra. It should be noted that, in fact, work product often is turned over
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IV. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
The deficiencies inherent in traditional analysis are apparent. The follow-
ing proposed analysis provides a practical method for resolving adverse
representation conflicts. The prolosal separates the question of attorney dis-
qualification from that of work product availability. 2 Treating the issues
separately helps strike the necessary balance between the competing social
and ethical considerations.
A. The Decision to Disqualify
The first step of the proposed analysis is to determine whether the at-
torney or law firm involved is attempting to represent both sides in the same
litigation. This clearly would be impermissible s3 and automatic disqualifica-
tion is warranted. 84 If the attorney or firm is not attempting simultaneous
representation of adverse clients, further analysis is required.
to substitute counsel under traditional analysis without considering the inconsistency
in order to ameliorate the harsh effects of disqualification on the client. See, e.g.,
IBM Corp: v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978). In addition, even if the
court screens the work product for taint, the court must effectively decide whether
the attorney had knowledge of relevant confidences. Where the court finds no ac-
tual knowledge, Canon 4 no longer requires disqualification because there is no
danger of tainting the trial by misuse of client confidences. Thus, if the work pro-
duct is made available, then the attorney's disqualification was unnecessary. This
also defeats the purpose of the presumed receipt of confidences because the former
client had to disclose those confidences in his effort to exclude the work product.
82. In First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d
201, 208 (7th Cir. 1978), the court noted that disqualification is primarily a sanc-
tion against the attorney, but withholding the work product punishes the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (Proposed Final Draft 1981)
separates attorney disqualification from work product availability. Basically, Model
Rule 1.9(a) adopts the substantial relationship test for use in determining whether
the attorney need be disqualified. Model Rule 1.9(b) frames the work product
availability issue in terms of use of information to the disadvantage of the attorney's
former client. The former client must give informed consent to the use of confidential
information before the work. product can be turned over to substitute counsel.
Although the rule attempts to separate the two issues in a manner similar to the
proposed analysis, it appears to be a mere restatement of the traditional analysis
of work product availability. The problem with Model Rule 1.9 is that it fails to
consider the duty imposed on the withdrawing attorney by MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A) (1979) to turn over his work product to
his current client. In addition, the former client consent provision, allowing a dis-
qualified attorney's work product to be made available to substitute counsel, would
seldom be helpful because few rational clients would be willing to consent to an
adverse use of their confidences.
83. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15
(1979). MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, EC 5-15 is identical. See also MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
84. Where a law firm has several offices in different cities, the ability to screen
a tainted attorney is greater than in a single office. It may be that the marriage of
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The second step is to determine whether the subjects of the conflicting
representations are substantially related.8 5 If no substantial relationship ex-
ists, the court will deny the motion to disqualify. 86 Where a substantial rela-
tionship between the conflicting representations exists, the court must care-
fully scrutinize the tainted attorney's degree of participation and potential
access to confidential information to determine whether a presumption that
he has knowledge of the former client's confidences is warranted.
If a substantial relationship is shown, the third step is to classify the situa-
tion into one of two categories: (1) the same firm is conducting the second
representation, or (2) a different firm is conducting the second representa-
tion, but it has an attorney who was a member of the firm that conducted
the first representation.
Where the same firm undertakes both representations, the duties im-
posed by Canons 4, 5, and 9justify per se disqualification. The prior client's
file is in the possession of the law firm and, although professional integrity
should prevent the opening of the file, there is a substantial possibility that
the prior client's confidences will be revealed. 87 This may be true even where
the attorney who actually represented the prior client has left the firm. ""just
as an attorney may not represent both sides within the same litigation, a
law firm should be prohibited from advocating a position adverse to one it
previously asserted on behalf of a client if that client's interest might be
adversely affected by the subsequent litigation.
When a different law firm is involved, automatic disqualification of the
firm is not justifiable.8 9 The firm defending against a disqualification mo-
tion should be allowed to establish either that the tainted attorney has no
Canon 4's duty to preserve confidences and Canon 9's duty to avoid the appearance
of impropriety can justifiably be used to prevent two branches of the same firm from
conducting both sides of the same litigation. This is one situation where appearances
convey such an undesirable image to the general public that an absolute rule against
such representation should be adopted. For an example of problems arising within
a law firm maintaining offices in two cities, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
85. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
86. Government of India v. Cook Industries, 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978).
87. See cases cited note 26 supra. Practically speaking, the fact that a law firm
is involved in subsequent rather than simultaneous representations of adverse in-
terests does not justify changing the per se disqualification rule. See note 84 and ac-
companying text supra. A firm attempting successive adverse representations should
not be permitted to use screening to avoid the conflict since the same entity
represented both interests.
88. If the attorney who represented the prior client has left the firm and the
law firm can establish that no remaining members of the firm have knowledge of
the prior client's confidences, then the per se rule should revert to a rebuttable
presumption.
89. Basically, the second category contains law firms who hire an attorney hav-
ing a conflict of interest with a present client or with clients coming to the firm after
the new attorney is employed by the firm.
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actual knowledge of the prior client's confidences or that the tainted attorney
has been effectively screened from participation in the second
representation. 90 The question then becomes whether the tainted attorney
in fact participated in the representation of both clients.
Where the tainted attorney can affirmatively demonstrate that he has
no actual knowledge of the prior client's confidences, both he and his firm
should be permitted to continue representation of the subsequent client
because there is no danger that confidences of the prior client will be
revealed. 91 Although this practice should not be encouraged, the right of
a client to freely obtain counsel of his choice outweighs any detrimental ef-
fects of continued representation. 92 A specific finding that the attorney lacks
actual knowledge of the prior client's confidences 93 should be enough to dispel
the suspicions of the general public.
The darfger of possible revelation of confidences is apparent, however,
and disqualification of both the tainted attorney and his new firm is necessary
where he has attempted to participate in both representations. 94 The oppor-
tunity to discuss the case with the tainted attorney creates the possibility of
an inadvertent disclosure of the prior client's confidences, 95 which justifies
vicarious disqualification of the firm96 or at least the members of the firm
working on the subsequent representation at the time disqualification is
ordered.
97
90. See note 84 supra.
91. See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron ofArizonav. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1980).
92. For cases noting the great weight to be given the right of a client to retain
counsel of his choice, see note 7 supra.
93. It is not unreasonable to assume that in many large law offices across the
United States, one department ofa law firm might be unaware of the smaller cases
being handled in another department of the law firm. Where no knowledge of con-
fidences actually exists, the imputation of taint by DR 5-105(D) should be considered
rebutted. This eliminates the need for disqualification and should permit the tainted
attorney to continue to participate in the litigation. See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron of Arizona
v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1980).
94. The basis for the disqualification is the same as used by the traditional
analysis-the preservation of client confidences under Canon 4 and DR 4-101. See
note 23 supra.
95. If the tainted attorney is permitted to participate in the subsequent litiga-
tion, then the tainted attorney's new law firm benefits, at least intangibly, from
the tainted attorney's knowledge of the confidences and secrets of the prior client.
For a related discussion of the taint of the disqualified attorney's knowledge of his
former client's confidences attaching to his work product, see notes 31-34 supra.
96. For a discussion of vicarious disqualification under DR 5-105(D), see note
24 and accompanying text supra.
97. The members of a firm who were actively involved in the litigation might
be the only members of the firm to be disqualified if the apparent exception to




Thompson: Thompson: Attorney Disqualification and Work Product Availability:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
These dangers are eliminated if the tainted attorney's new firm prevents
him from participating in the subsequent representation. By erecting a
Chinese Wall around the tainted attorney and barring him from sharing in
the anticipated fee, the firm has taken all necessary steps to insure the preser-
vation of the prior client's confidences. 98 Even if the tainted attorney ac-
tively participated in representing the prior client, his presence in the new
firm does not present a substantial danger that he will reveal client confidences
if he has been shielded from participation in the subsequent representation.
Although the no-fee requirement removes much of the economic incen-
tive for revealing a client's confidences, its use as an absolute requirement
for setting up an effective Chinese Wall, and thereby avoiding vicarious dis-
qualification, is flawed. Most attorneys would not breach their ethical duties
solely for personal gain; for those who would, there are rewards-promotion,
partnership, or a larger piece of the partnership pie-beyond the fee involved
in the particular case. The reliability of no-fee arrangements as an absolute
standard, then, is questionable.
Nevertheless, courts seem to apply it as such. In Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc. ,99
the district court allowed a law firm employing a tainted attorney to con-
tinue its conflicting representation. The court based its ruling, in part, on
the inclusion of a no-fee clause in a nonparticipation agreement made with
the tainted attorney prior to his association with the firm. 100 Since a no-fee
agreement does not guarantee that confidences will not be divulged, it should
be merely one factor used by the courts in determining whether a law firm
employing a tainted attorney should continue its participation. Thus, where
the only breach of a Chinese Wall involves the sharing of the fee with the
tainted attorney, the firm should be permitted to continue its representa-
tion. Because there is some additional incentive in fee-sharing, however,
any additional breach of the wall should be sufficient to vicariously disqualify
the entire firm.
98. This requires extension of the Chinese Wall defense to situations other
than those involving a former government attorney. See, e.g., Lemaire v. Texaco,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1309-10 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (non-participation agreement
between attorneys prior to tainted attorney's affiliation with new firm held suffi-
cient to prevent imputation of confidences). For the general requirements of an ef-
fective Chinese Wall, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517 (1976); Comment, The Chinese
Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 692 (1980). At-
torneys who have worked in the private sector present no greater danger of reveal-
ing confidences upon the erection of an effective Chinese Wall than do tainted former
government attorneys. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 453 (2d Cir.)
(Meskill, J., concurring & dissenting) ("I do not see why a Chinese Wall should
be thought more impervious to information that originated from a government in-
vestigation than to information learned from a client with adverse interests."),
vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1980).
99. 496 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
100. Id. at 1309-10.
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Disqualification should be considered case-by-case. Timing of the mo-
tion to disqualify should not determine the disposition of the motion, 10 1
though late filings should be scrutinized closely since they can be effective
delaying tactics. Courts would be justified in awarding costs and attorneys'
fees for defense of a disqualification motion filed shortly before trial if it lacks
merit or if the conflict should have been discovered and raised earlier.10 2 Pro-
fessional courtesy should prevent the practice of filing disqualification mo-
tions shortly before trial; barring that, court sanctions should suffice.
B. Work Product Availability
Once an attorney has been disqualified, the issue becomes whether his
work product should be made available to the client it was prepared for. 103
The courts in these cases are faced with the distasteful task of deciding which
of two innocent clients must bear the loss for the attorney's actions.
When the court disqualifies an attorney, he is placed in a position of
101. But cf. Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 581 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975) (had
motion been filed earlier, it would have warranted serious consideration); Central
Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1978)
(same). See also note 52 and accompanying text supra.
102. MO. R. Civ. P. 77.01, 77.02 should be sufficiently broad to allow Missouri
courts to award the costs of defending untimely motions to disqualify which are
found to have been interposed for delay and to be without merit. See also FED. R.
CIv. P. 11, 54(d).
103. Attorney disqualification due to the existence of an adverse representa-
tion conflict also raises the question of the entitlement of the disqualified attorney
to a fee. Classification of the disqualification order as either a discharge for cause
or a discharge not for cause determines the attorney's entitlement to a fee. In
Missouri and most jurisdictions, the client has an absolute right to discharge his
attorney at any time. In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. En Banc 1963). If
the attorney has a contingent fee contract with his client and is discharged not for
cause by his client, the attorney may elect to sue in quantum meruit or wait until
the client obtains a judgment and then sue for the full contingent fee. Id. In In re
Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978), the disqualified attorney was held not entitled
to any fee due to the attorney's acceptance of employment adverse to the interests
of a current client without obtaining the client's consent. Id. at 417.
Under traditional analysis, where a client is denied access to his disqualified at-
torney's work product, the disqualification order should be classified as discharge
for cause and the disqualified attorney would therefore be denied a fee. See id. at
417. If access to the disqualified attorney's work product is allowed, then a claim
against the client should lie for the reasonable value of the services rendered by the
disqualified attorney in preparation of the work product. In this instance, the dis-
qualified attorney's quantum meruit claim should be permitted to prevent unjust
enrichment, but a full contingent fee should be denied because the attorney's own
conduct created the need for disqualification. Under the proposed analysis, the work
product of a disqualified attorney would always be made available to the client so
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mandatory withdrawal under DR 2-110. Subsection (A) requires that a
lawyer not withdraw "until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to the rights of his client, including ... delivering to the client
all papers and property to which the client is entitled." 104 When the court
denies a client access to his file, it has effectively forced the attorney into
choosing between a violation of DR 2-110(A) and a contempt citation. 0 5
Assume that attorney A has been actively involved in representing C1
and later undertakes to represent C2 in a substantially related matter adverse
to Cl's interests. Because A has been actively involved in representing C1,
it is easy to presume that A's work product is tainted, at least intangibly,
by his knowledge of Cl's confidences. If C1 seeks access to C2's file at this
point, a traditional work product question arises. When the court disqualifies
A, and C2 then seeks access to his own file, the question is different. Although
A's work product is tainted by Cl's confidences, the file should nonetheless
be given to C2.10 6 This approach can be contrasted with strict traditional
104. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A) (1979).
Id. EC 7-8 states, "A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions
of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considera-
tions. A lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not
do so." See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.4, 2.1
(Proposed Final Draft 1981).
105. If the attorney opts for the contempt citation, he may also be subjecting
himself to disciplinary action for violation of MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(A) (1979) for disregarding a ruling of the court. Mo.
SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-106(A) is identical. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.4(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
106. The decision to disqualify counsel triggers the ethical duties imposed on
the disqualified attorney by MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-110 (1979). Court-ordered disqualification of counsel falls into the mandatory
withdrawal category of id. DR 2-110(B)(2):
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if:
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will
result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
A lawyer who continued to participate in litigation after a court ordered his dis-
qualification from the case would violate id. DR 7-106(A) (disregard of a ruling
tribunal). When a lawyer is faced with a mandatory withdrawal situation, id. DR
2-1 10(A)(2) places general duties upon the attorney to perform prior to withdrawal:
"In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client .... deliver-
ing to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled . . . . " See
also Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, 362 F. Supp. 694, 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (court granted motion to withdraw, ordering counsel to "deliver copies of
all papers and materials in their possession relating to the action or to the proposed
cross-claim to their successor attorneys, on demand, against receipt."). See generally
[Vol. 47
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analysis, where the work product is deemed per se tainted and unavailable
to C2. 107 Traditional analysis ignores not only C2's right to have A explain
the way his case was being handled but his right to gain access to his file
before disqualification.
During the existence of the attorney-client relationship, the attorney is
under an ethical duty to keep the client thoroughly informed about the status
of the representation. Although this duty is implied by the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, 10 a much clearer and more definitive state-
ment is found in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about a mat-
ter by periodically advising the client of its status and progress and
by promptly complying with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain the legal and practical aspects of a mat-
ter and alternative courses of action to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation. 0 9
Prior to A's disqualification, then, he had a duty to inform C2 about the status
of the representation. IfA was, in fact, tainted, the information already given
to C2 was at least intangibly infected with his taint.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-32 (1979), which amplifies
the DR 2-110 duties.
Because the ethical duties imposed upon attorneys in withdrawal situations con-
flict with Canon 4's mandate to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client,
a rule of priority must be established to resolve the conflicting ethical duties. The
proposed analysis makes the Canon 4 duty to preserve confidences subservient to
the DR 2-110(A) duty to deliver to clients all papers and property before a lawyer
withdraws from a case. This result is supported by reading the DR 2-110(A) re-
quirements into DR 4-101(C)(2), which permits revelation of client confidences
"when permitted under Disciplinary Rules." The DR 4-101(C) exceptions allowing
disclosure of client confidences als6 indicate that the duty to preserve a former
client's confidences should not be read to require prejudice to the rights of another
client by denying access to the attorney's work product. Any harm resulting from
the disclosure of the prior client's confidences can be adequately redressed by a
malpractice action, the disciplinary machinery of the bar, or both. See notes 113-14
and accompanying text infra. In addition, a finding that the Canon 4 duty to preserve
client confidences takes priority over DR 2-1 10(A)'s duty to deliver all papers and
property prior to withdrawal has numerous undesirable results. See, e.g., First
Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 208-09 (7th
Cir. 1978).
107. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
108. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not specific-
ally state that the attorney has the affirmative duty to explain the case to his client.
A reading of MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(a)(3),
DR 9-102(B)(1), EC 7-8, EC 9-2 (1979) discloses that the duty does exist. See also
Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1240 (1977).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
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If none of Cl's confidences are contained in C2's file, there is no com-
pelling reason to withhold the file. If there are confidences contained in the
file, the subsequent client should already be aware of them.I10 Because the
disqualified attorney has already breached Cl's confidences in his reports
and explanations to C2, the only purpose served by denying access is to harm
the innocent subsequent client."'
Ideally, neither client should be required to answer for the misconduct
of his attorney. When one client is injured by such Misconduct, the harm
is not lessened by punishing the other.1 2 In giving the subsequent client ac-
cess to his file, the court gives him nothing that he did not already know or
have the right to know. The burden of misconduct should fall on the attorney,
not the clients.
C. Remedies
By giving the subsequent client access to his file, the prior client is only
denied a remedy within the pending litigation. The prior client can still bring
an ethical complaint or a malpractice action against the attorney who
breached his confidences. Such a breach should be a prima facie case of
malpractice if the client establishes (1) the existence of a prior attorney-client
relationship, (2) that the attorney received confidences relevant to the subse-
quent representation, (3) that the subsequent representation was adverse,
(4) that the confidences were breached, and (5) that the client was materially
damaged as a direct result of the breach.1 3 If the client has not been materially
damaged, then no harm has occurred except the revelation of confidential
110. It should be noted that the ability of an attorney to assert either a charg-
ing or a retaining lien, even if prejudicial to the rights of his client, might provide
a bootstrapping analogy for making Canon 4's duty to preserve client confidences
superior to the DR 2-110 duty to deliver papers and property to a client prior to
withdrawal. In Academy of California Optometrists v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App.
3d 999, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1975), the court rejected a lawyer's ability to assert
a lien to the prejudice of his client's rights. The court of appeals stated, "To en-
force the lien in question here would be to condone a violation of the foregoing ethical
duties [e.g. ,.those imposed by DR 2-1 10(A)] owed by a lawyer to his client, con-
trary to the public policy of this state." Id. at 1006, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 672. Missouri
Bar Advisory Opinion 115, reprinted in 35 J. Mo. B. 340 (1979), reaches a similar
result. For a discussion of the distinction between a charging lien and a retaining
lien, see Wentworth, Attorney's Liens-A Survey anda Proposal, 35 CONN. B.J. 191,
191-95 (1961); Recent Developments in Missouri: Civil Practice and Procedure, 48 UMKC
L. REV. 513, 513-17 (1980).
111. See First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d
201, 208 (7th Cir. 1978).
112. See generally Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
113. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33, 43-44 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Lieberman v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 84 N.J.
325, 341-44, 419 A.2d 417, 425-27 (1980).
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information. The bar's disciplinary machinery is the most appropriate forum
for resolution of such complaints.
By channeling these sanctions into more appropriate forums, undue
delay in the litigation process is avoided. Although other methods of analyzing
the work product issue have been advanced by courts and commentators, 114
these methods fail to properly allocate the burden of responsibility for at-
torney misconduct. They do not consider the attorney's duty to deliver his
client's file on his withdrawal from representation. They do not address the
appropriateness and problems of using pending litigation to resolve issues
of attorney misconduct. Other questions of attorney misconduct have
historically been redressed by malpractice suits and disciplinary actions. At-
torney misconduct in the context of adverse representation conflicts should
be handled the same way.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Comment has demonstrated, traditional analysis does not resolve
the issues of attorney disqualification and work product availability. Another
method of analysis is needed, one that accommodates the court's desire for
flexibility, the attorney's need for predictability, and the client's right to
counsel of his choice. The proposed analysis attempts to meet these re-
quirements. By using the analysis outlined in Part IV of this Comment,
courts can increase the predictability of disqualification decisions, avoid the
delays inherent in handling such disputes within pending litigation, protect
the rights of subsequefit clients, and put the burden of attorney misconduct
where it .belongs-on the attorney.
STAN THOMPSON
114. See generally Comment, Access to Work Product of Disqualified Counsel, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 443 (1979); Comment, TheAvailability ofthe Work Product ofa Disqualified
Attorney: What Standard?, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (1979); Comment, Access to the
Work Product ofa DisqualifiedAttorney, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 105; First Wisconsin Mort-
gage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corporation-Disqualification of an Attorney Does Not
Compel Disqualification of His 'Work Product, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 163; Ethics-Access of
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